Following the invitation from IRPA to comment on the article written by Professor Roger Clarke entitled 'Control of low-level radiation exposure: time for a change?', the Board of the French Society for Radiation Protection (SFRP) decided to set up a working group on 'controllable dose'. The latter, which worked from April 1999 to July 2000, consisted of some 20 members representing the stakeholders involved in radiological protection in France: authorities, experts and professionals from nuclear, medical and research fields as well as associated bodies. The working group first examined the current hypotheses on radiological risk and noted their relevance to the practical management of such a risk. Then a list of the different exposure situations and their associated characteristics was elaborated in tabular form, followed by a discussion on the situations when the system of radiological protection works well, less well or badly, particularly through the implementation of the general principles of radiological protection. The working group finally made proposals to ICRP for the evolution of the system in a more workable direction.
Introduction
Following the invitation from the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) to comment on the article written by Professor Roger Clarke entitled 'Control of low-level radiation exposure: time for a change?' [1] , the Board of the French Society for Radiation Protection (SFRP) decided to set up a working group (WG). The latter, which worked from April 1999 to July 2000, consisted of some 20 members representing the stakeholders involved in radiological protection in France: authorities, experts and professionals from nuclear, medical and research fields as well as associated bodies (see detailed list of members in appendix A).
Radiological protection standards are elaborated in cycles, beginning with the drawing up of a summary statement of scientific knowledge at international level and ending, several years later, with the updating of national regulations. In the meantime, several international organisations, governmental or non-governmental, take it in turns to recommend standards to individual countries, making allowance for feed-back and for the most recent scientific, technical, economic and social data. The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) plays a key role in this process since the regulations in force in the majority of countries refer to its regularly published recommendations.
The last cycle, marked by publication 60 of the ICRP [2] , is coming to completion with, as far as the member states of the European Union are concerned, the incorporation of the 96/29/Euratom directive [3] into national law. A new cycle is beginning. The final result, a few years from now, will be a new generation of ICRP recommendations. In this context, it is worth considering the way in which previous radiological protection systems operate, without necessarily calling them into question completely.
Clarke's article was received by the WG as a preliminary proposal intended to broaden the process by which standards are drawn up by encouraging dialogue at an international level. Taking Clarke's article and its own thoughts as a basis, the WG set itself the aim of formulating questions and proposals for submission to the ICRP. The WG made no attempt to make a complete break with the past but gave thought to the appropriateness of the radiological protection system as a whole and the improvements which could be brought to make it clearer and more workable.
The group is far from having exhausted the subject but its reflections put it in a position to contribute, on behalf of the SFRP, to the international debate on the evolution of the radiological protection system which took place during the Hiroshima IRPA 10 Congress in May 2000. This article, approved by the Board of SFRP, summarises the conclusions of the WG at the end of its mandate.
Basis of the radiological risk management system
The radiological protection system is based on scientific knowledge of the biological effects of ionising radiation. The WG acknowledges that the effects of low-level radiation doses are fuelling persistent scientific controversy, particularly when it comes to deciding whether or not there is a threshold in the dose-effect relationship [4, 5] . Science is progressing and the way forward is becoming clearer, but as yet there is still no consensus.
In his article, Clarke indicates that 'in respect of current knowledge it has been argued here that the evidence weighs against the concept of a low dose threshold and favours the existing judgement that tumour risk will rise as a simple function of dose even at very low doses and dose rates. That is not to say that dose thresholds for tumour induction are not biologically feasible'. He adds that 'radiological protection systems need to be as simple as possible and to focus on the general consistency of all relevant data, not just the inevitable biological intricacies and exceptions'.
In his opinion, 'ICRP judges that the weight of evidence at present falls in favour of assuming that those radiation events are potentially disruptive from the lowest doses. And while apoptosis, cellular surveillance, immune and adaptive responses are all real, they are most likely to modify the shape of the dose-response curve rather than proving a threshold'. He deduces that 'the major policy implication of a non-threshold relationship for stochastic effects is that some finite risk must be accepted at any level of protection. Zero risk is not an option and this leads to the three principles that comprise the current policy of the Commission: justification. . ., optimisation. . ., limitation. . .'.
However, Clarke also underlines that the linear non-threshold hypothesis has to be considered in the light of legal aspects: 'increasingly, science is judged in the courts rather than by national academies of science. Judge and jury are increasingly likely to decide the issue and it is they who must be convinced as to whether there is a threshold and thus no risks at low doses of radiation'.
As for the WG, the recourse in France to legal action is less frequent than in certain countries but could become increasingly common, particularly now that the concept of putting another person's life in danger has been introduced into the penal code. In this respect, legal cases concern the protection of both workers and the public.
Furthermore, the WG notes that judges do not generally give a verdict on the existence of a risk but rather on the actions undertaken to manage it (particularly the implementation of the precautionary principle). Consequently, even with the prospect of legal action, it seems less relevant to determine a threshold below which the risk would be considered in all situations as trivial or non-existent than to demonstrate that mechanisms have been set in place to make the risk acceptable to those exposed to it.
The large majority of members of the WG agree that the hypothesis of a linear nonthreshold dose-effect relationship, corresponding an attitude of caution, continues to be appropriate as far as the management of radiological risk is concerned.
However, for the WG as a whole, the radiological protection system should make a clearer distinction between scientific and risk management aspects. In particular, it is important to specify that the linear non-threshold relationship is a hypothesis which could under-or overestimate certain exposures and has the effect of assuming that a risk exists for dose ranges for which it has been neither proven nor disproven scientifically.
Thus, the large majority of WG members agree with Clarke that it is appropriate to keep the hypothesis of a linear non-threshold relationship and acknowledge, as he does, the same implications for the management of radiological risk.
The general principles of radiological protection
In his article Clarke proposes major modifications of three general principles of radiological protection. The WG examined the relevance of these three principles and the way in which they are currently implemented.
The principle of justification
Although the principle of justification is a regulatory requirement, its application is vague, not always subjected to a formal procedure or sanctioned by a decision. Can a practice be taken as being justified just because it is subject to the regulatory control system? Who decides whether or not an exposure situation is justified? In reality, it is not always a government authority. The way in which the principle is worded in ICRP publication 60 can be interpreted as the need to put the advantages and detriments associated with the practice into a mathematical equation. But these elements are very difficult to quantify. Furthermore, the ICRP points out that, in most cases, the radiological detriment caused is just one of the disadvantages of the practice and that it carries little weight in the authorising decision-making process [2] .
The WG notes that the question of justification often arises in a context of optimisation. Overlap of the principles of justification and optimisation seems more frequent downstream, i.e. closer to the exposed individuals (justification of a given task at worksite level for example) than upstream (justification of a practice which may be nuclear power or the use of radiation for medical purposes). Thus, the justification of a practice seems to be less workable than the justification of exposures of given individuals.
Clarke proposes a way in which to tackle this issue: 'since radiological protection essentially plays such a minor part in a government's decision to justify the introduction, or the con-tinuation, of a given use of radiation, consideration should be given to dropping the principle of justification from the ICRP system'. If this means that there is no need to apply the principle of justification, the WG feels uncomfortable with this proposal. Even though, judging by appearances at least, it is rarely applied, the principle remains usefully applicable in a number of cases.
For example, application of the justification principle to exposure of a patient is a key element of the risk management system in the medical field, particularly since dose limits do not apply. The ICRP has established three levels at which this principle should be applied in this field [6] :
• justification of the use of radiation in medicine, • justification of a given medical procedure, • justification of the use of a procedure for a given patient.
This principle is also invoked in proposing the banning of certain practices at a general level (the deliberate addition of radioactive substances to foodstuffs, toys, personal ornaments or cosmetics) or at a more particular level (foot radioscopy to determine shoe size, use of a radioactive source in the grain gauges of combine harvesters, etc).
In fact, as soon as a new exposure situation is created, the question should be asked, from the radiological protection point of view, whether or not the same objective could be achieved without exposure or with less exposure and, if not, whether or not the benefits are high enough to compensate for the radiological detriment. If the question of justification does not arise specifically, the system could, in the most extreme cases, lead to optimisation of unjustified situations.
It is the opinion of the WG that although the elements entering into the decision-making process entail considerations which often go beyond the field of radiological protection, justification remains a key principle in a responsible radiological risk management system since it is a way of appraising risks and accounting for how they are managed. This is particularly important in a context where the justification of risk situations, the transparency around their management methods and, at times, more active involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process, are being increasingly requested by society as conditions for acceptance of risk.
Nonetheless, the WG recognises that application of the principle is hindered by a lack of procedures and objective criteria which would make it easier to use.
The WG invites the ICRP to propose such criteria and to consider application of the principle in situations not currently covered by the radiological protection system (natural exposure or very slightly enhanced natural exposure). For example, the WG considers that the justification principle could be more comprehensive and practical if, further to current practice, it was applied to exposure situations (characterised by a given combination of a source, a context and exposed individuals).
The principle of optimisation
3.2.1. ALARA/ALARP. Clarke advocates a new definition of the optimisation principle. He suggests replacing 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA), which, in his opinion, has been associated with cost/benefit analysis and with the use of collective doses, by the expression 'as low as reasonably practicable' (ALARP).
To the French way of thinking, it is difficult to understand the slight difference between ALARA and ALARP. The WG points out, however, that optimisation is associated not only with the elements quoted by Clarke but also involves numerous other criteria such as individual dose, technical feasibility, etc. Furthermore, its implementation is integrated into a radiological protection culture, overstepping cost/benefit analysis.
The most exposed individual.
Clarke is of the opinion that the protection of the individual is the main concern in risk management. For him, 'if the individual is sufficiently protected from a single source, then that is a sufficient criterion for the control of the source'. He sets up the principle that 'if the risk of harm to the health of the most exposed individual is trivial, then the total risk is trivial-irrespective of how many people are exposed'. Further on in his article, Clarke expresses the same idea differently: '. . . the proposed policy of protection ensures that if the most exposed representative individual is sufficiently protected from a given source, then everyone else is also sufficiently protected from that source'.
The WG agrees with the idea that it is important to take an interest in the risk to the individual but feels that the above principle, with its different wording, is not devoid of ambiguity. While there is no problem from a biological point of view, since individual sensitivity to ionising radiation is already taken into account in risk assessment, this principle can be contested from an epidemiological viewpoint. It does not work if the risk is not trivial, it does not have any real meaning in the medical field and it does not correspond to risk management philosophy in other areas. This principle should be elaborated before an application can be found.
The collective dose.
Another implication derived by Clarke from his new principle is that: 'there would be no use made of collective dose as currently defined'. This prospect was not approved by the majority of the WG members. While welcoming the strengthening of individual protection, they warn against neglect of the collective aspect of protection.
It is true that using a collective dose can lead to an incorrect perception of the risk to the community, particularly when it is calculated by adding very low individual doses of a large number of individuals over long periods. Even the ICRP has warned against using the concept of collective dose in this way [7] . Nonetheless, it is relevant to make allowance for both individual and collective doses, even if the management tools are different. The collective dose concept should be retained as a management tool for protecting both workers and the public.
Moreover, with some precautions, the collective dose can be used as an indicator of risk. In the opinion of the WG, it should not be used to express an excess risk without providing the parameters delineating the context (population involved, time and space considered). However, it is suitable for putting into perspective one risk against another or for assessing the effectiveness of various options for radiological protection.
The trivial dose level.
Clarke also echoes the concerns of many people about the cost of decommissioning nuclear facilities or remediation of contaminated sites: 'too much money is being, and will be, spent to achieve low levels of residual contamination'. In order to alleviate this concern, in the absence of a threshold in the dose-effect relationship, some suggest determining a 'trivial dose' level, i.e. one below which the risk would be 'so low as to be beneath regulatory concern' and thus as 'there would be no need to involve any system of protection'. Clarke suggests that the trivial dose level should be set at about 30 µSv. The corresponding risk is 'commonly regarded as trivial'.
The members of the WG are divided on this question. A few consider that it is legitimate to set at the international level an order of magnitude of risk regarded as trivial and the corresponding dose. This generic level would be a reference level for all exposure situations. It could, for example, be based on enquiries about human behaviour and preferences. The same members think that the determination of such a level should not exclude a debate on risk acceptability involving stakeholders where relevant, for example when confidence is weak.
The majority of the WG are of the opinion that there does not exist a risk which is trivial in itself but only a level of risk accepted in a given context. It is therefore irrelevant to fix a preset dose level at which the risk would a priori be classified as trivial. There certainly exists, for the majority of exposure situations, a dose level below which it is no longer appropriate to take any action to further reduce the risk. However, this level differs from one situation to another. It should be determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the optimisation principle which means in essence that the effort to reduce doses should be stepped up according to the characteristics of the exposure situation. In the complete wording of this principle, the term 'reasonably' and the extension 'economic and social factors being taken into account' indicates that it is not appropriate to systematically try to achieve zero risk.
The identification of an accepted dose level for a given situation should not lead, however, to a reduction in vigilance for this situation as the implementation of an optimisation principle should be seen as a continuous incentive to go forward.
Most of the WG considers that building a system of radiological risk management depends on what experts have to say about trivial dose levels but mostly on concrete, constructive explanation of the factors taken into account in the assessment of exposure situations and the creation of protection policies. This approach would fuel the debate on residual risk, perhaps by encouraging greater involvement of stakeholders in the decision-making process. The new recommendations to be published by the ICRP should emphasise the importance of optimisation to testify to the application of responsible risk management.
Taking account of other risks.
Another aspect of the optimisation principle which deserves to be examined by the ICRP is the need to appreciate the occupational risk as a whole. Workers are indeed subjected to a multitude of nuisances (heat, noise, enclosed spaces, moving in congested areas, chemical or biological risks, ionising or non-ionising radiations, etc) and exposure to radiation is just one aspect of their working conditions.
The principle of limitation of exposure
The individual dose limit is a dose level which, by law, should not be exceeded (it is an offence to do so). It applies to the total dose received by an individual from all the sources taken into account in the radiological protection system (practices).
The WG is of the opinion that the dose limit is a relevant and indispensable reference for the protection of exposed workers, whose individual dose monitoring system records the exposure resulting from their entire occupational activity. The relevance of a dose limit for the public is less obvious since it is impossible to measure the individual dose resulting from whole sources. Clarke emphasises the confusion arising from a misunderstanding of dose limits, particularly as far as the public dose limit is concerned.
The principle of controllable dose.
In the system proposed by Clarke, the concept of dose limit would disappear to make way for the principle of 'control the dose to the representative member of the most highly exposed group'. In particular, 'there would be no need for the existing 1 mSv dose limit for the public'.
In so far as the WG has fully grasped the concept of controllable dose, it means a dose included, whatever the exposure situation, in a range defined by two criteria: one quantitative (doses below the unacceptable level of risk) and the other qualitative (doses which can be reduced or prevented, without significant disruption to lifestyle). In Clarke's article, controllable doses are written out on a dosimetric scale. They range between a maximum level which it is unacceptable to exceed, unless human life is at stake (set at around 30 mSv) and a minimum level below which 'there should be no need to consider protection of the individual' (around 30 µSv). The maximum acceptable dose level is called the 'action level' and the levels below it are called 'investigation levels'. This scale does not specify whether the levels are or are not to be considered as annual values.
As previously mentioned, most members of the WG expressed reticence with regard to presetting a trivial dose level. They have the same concern about presetting a single dose level for which the risk would be considered as unacceptable regardless of the exposure situation. For example, 30 mSv cannot be considered to be a high level where medical exposures are concerned. Furthermore, the terminology used is unsatisfactory since it means that it is possible to wait until the maximum dose is reached before taking any action.
Additionally, most of the WG considered that it would be unrealistic to stop using the concept of dose limit: an individual limit must be set which borders the range of doses in a normal situation, applicable to all individuals, as is the case for all risks due to toxic and carcinogenic substances. From a legal point of view, it is necessary to set limits in order to treat as an offence the exceeding of these limits. Furthermore, the WG notes that the determination of the limit is based not only on health criteria but also on other considerations such as technical, social or even political ones.
3.3.2.
Single/multisource related limit. The current annual dose limit applies to the doses from all the sources. Most of the WG is of the opinion that replacing this referent by a source related dose limit would not be a cure-all. Indeed, if it were to be determined by breaking down the multisource limit, a necessarily arbitrary denominator would have to be used. However, flexibility is useful for making allowance for the various characteristics of sources: it could be allowed that the contribution of one source be greater than that of the others as soon as they have all been optimised and the total does not exceed the preset limit. A system with a limit which makes allowance for all sources is obviously more complex than one using a source related limit. It therefore has to be transparent and substantiated.
In this context, it seems necessary to explain the method used to check compliance with the public dose limit. Exposures due to a source are evaluated for a member of the reference group (the group of more highly exposed individuals). The contribution from other sources would have to be added to this. The reference group method can cope with this, but several questions arise. Should this group be hypothetical and include as many penalties as possible or should it be realistic? For a given source, should there be one single reference group or one per exposure pathway (external exposure, ingestion, inhalation)? Where should the reference group be placed to take account of the other sources: close to the source in question or at the intersection between the various sources located in the same area? Should another method be adopted, consisting of tracing isodose curves around each source and then detecting any 'hot spots' at the intersections? The ICRP could provide advice on these questions.
Dose constraint.
There is a single source related indicator which use is to be recommended for the protection of both workers and the public. This is the annual individual dose constraint, the level of which is set and applied on a case-by-case basis to facilitate optimisation. The dose constraint makes it possible to integrate feedback experience and know-how at any given moment for any given practice, independently of the dose limit. The collective dose may also be subjected to a constraint.
As far as the public is concerned, the dose associated with the release limits is sometimes likened to a dose constraint. Nonetheless, it is important to make a clear distinction between the two concepts since release limits have regulatory status and it is an offence to exceed them, but this does not apply to dose constraints. For this reason, some WG members would prefer to use a dose constraint rather than a source related dose limit for the management of public exposure. On the other hand, some others are in favour of a source related limit to be used as a legally binding indicator.
As far as workers are concerned, individual dose constraint has several objectives, depending on the case: making allowance for each exposure source integrated into the calculation of the total dose (for example miners who accumulate exposure to radon, dust and gamma radiation); organising the distribution of individual doses at worksite level in the framework of a collective dose constraint (exposure smoothing); and facilitating the management of exposure of temporary or itinerant workers.
In all cases, it is essential that the value of dose constraint be set on a case-by-case basis rather than once and for all in ICRP recommendations or national regulations.
To conclude, because all exposure situations give rise to a risk of same nature, i.e. a radiological risk, it is relevant to apply to all of them a common philosophy of risk management. This philosophy finds expression in the three current general principles which are interrelated: justification, optimisation and limitation. They should be maintained in the future system as they actually attest to the application of a responsible management of the risk. But concrete methods for their implementation still need to be improved.
Exposure situations
While applying a unique philosophy for the management of all exposure situations, it has to be considered that these situations have a large diversity and complexity. Specific risk management methods have to be defined according to their characteristics, as well as appropriate tools and indicators.
The existing system already divides exposure situations into categories for management purposes: practice/intervention, occupational/medical/public, natural/artificial/enhancednatural, etc. Some of these divisions are relevant, other are ineffective. Would a different way of classifying exposure situations be more workable?
In his article, Clarke, noting that certain situations 'do not easily fall into the current definitions of practice or intervention', considers that 'radiological protection philosophy might usefully be re-examined in order to develop an alternative logically consistent framework for protection to that used at present'. He proposes to 'bring the three categories of exposure, occupational, medical and public, within an overall framework that encompasses the present system of protection for practices and interventions'.
The WG, for its part, tried to identify and characterise the various exposure situations, including those which were experienced in the past and which are nowadays considered to be unjustified. The identified situations are presented appendices B and C. The three components of an exposure situation are the source, the context giving rise to the exposure and the exposed individuals. The exposure sources are divided into two major categories: sources of natural origin (cosmic or terrestrial gamma radiation, radon and other naturally occurring radionuclides) and those of artificial origin (sealed and non-sealed sources, radiation generators, etc). For each source, the various contexts giving rise to exposure are distinguished (in the industrial or medical fields, inside buildings, caused by the use of consumer products, in radiological emergencies or due to lasting exposure, etc) as well as the categories of exposed individuals (occupants of houses, users, consumers, exposed or non-exposed workers, patients, future generations, etc).
The main criteria characterising the situations in an appropriate manner as regards risk management were then identified as follows:
• According to the possibility (slight, moderate or strong) of directly measuring the doses received by each exposed individual, taking into account the implementation of means proportionate to the radiation protection stake.
• According to the possibility of implementing an action to control the dose: this possibility is considered as being strong or slight but never nil (when it is not possible to take action on the source, it is always, in theory, possible to mitigate the exposure of individuals from this source, even if it is a natural one); on the other hand, it may not be relevant to take any action (for example, it is not considered appropriate to encourage people to spend less time in mountainous regions even though they are more exposed to cosmic rays there).
• According to the benefit for the exposed individual of the exposure situation. The benefit may be: * direct and of high degree, when the benefit is personal and the exposure is inherent in the category of exposed individual (for example in the case of patients); * direct and of low degree, when the benefit is personal but the exposure is not inherent in the category of exposed individual (for example in the case of users of consumer products containing radioactivity); * indirect when the benefit is for the community (for example in the case of residents near a nuclear facility) or; * nil, when the situation does not present any advantage for the exposed individual or when the detriment is higher than the advantages (for example in the case of emergency public exposure).
• According to the finality of the radiological protection, distinguishing between:
* situations in which radiation is used deliberately: the objective in this case is to increase exposure by as little as possible (making allowance for the optimisation principle); these situations can be likened to the 'practices' referred to in ICRP publication 60 [2] ; * situations in which the radiation source is present de facto (for example radiological emergencies or lasting exposure): the objective in this case is to reduce exposure as much as possible (making allowance for the optimisation principle); these situations correspond to the 'intervention' concept referred to in ICRP publication 60 [2] .
• According to the order of magnitude of the individual exposure.
Some of these criteria were also identified by Clarke who considers that 'the significance of a level of controllable dose depends on its magnitude, the benefit to that individual and the ease of reducing or preventing the dose'.
The analysis made by the WG confirmed the large range of different and complex exposure situations. In the real world, these different exposure situations are experienced by people from very different backgrounds and cultures and not all are governed by the same management authority. The characteristics and corresponding risk levels vary, considerably at times, from one exposure situation to another (for example the risk run by someone living in the vicinity of a nuclear facility is not the same as that run by a patient undergoing radiation therapy). Finally it has to be remembered that the acceptability of risk remains closely connected with the nature of the exposure situation and that it is not only related to the level of radiological protection (exposure level) but also to political, social, cultural and safety aspects. The WG concludes that simplification, whereby exposures of all origins for a given individual are managed together in a global approach, is not feasible.
Finally, the WG identified further research issues. Thought should be given as to how the various exposure situations can be grouped into families as a function of the above listed characteristics. Then suitable management methods should be determined for each family. At present, the radiological protection system provides professionals with a series of indicators and tools for managing exposure situations (dose, dose limit, dose constraint, individual dose, collective dose, level of investigation, of action, of intervention, of exemption, of clearance, critical group, etc). They are used when implementing the three basic radiological protection principles defined by the ICRP (justification of practices, optimisation of protection and limitation of individual exposures). Which indicators and tools are really useful? For whom? To do what? How are they used? The WG considers that these questions have to be answered before the radiological protection system can be changed to make it more workable.
Elements contributing to acceptability of radiological risk
The main difficulty encountered when implementing the existing radiological protection system, as highlighted by Clarke, resides in the management of exposure situations involving low doses. When looking at the efficiency of the current system, it appears that, generally speaking, it works well for the protection of workers, less well (poor understanding, unsuitable tools, etc) when the public and radiological emergency situations are involved, and badly for continuing exposure situations (contaminated sites, enhanced natural exposure). In fact, and particularly for the situations where the system is less efficient, the main challenge for radiation protection professionals is to find out the elements contributing to the acceptability of radiological risk. The WG has identified some of these elements as follows.
Improve dialogue between stakeholders
Further dialogue between stakeholders on the issue of management of radiological risk would help to explain what is at stake, the criteria affecting decisions and the factors to be taken into account. In the case of contaminated sites, for example, one approach is becoming apparent: decentralised risk management. Dialogue between stakeholders appears more and more to be a crucial part of the decision-making process as regards risk activities. It allows confidence to be gained or recovered where relevant. It can also be useful for determining the acceptable level of risk for corresponding exposure situations. The new recommendations to be published by the ICRP should take all these elements into account.
Provide means for an individual appraisal of risk
The 'subjects to the risk' should have access to information on the various exposure sources they encounter, as well as on the corresponding individual doses and associated potential risks. On this basis, each individual could total the doses he/she receives and come to his/her own conclusions about the radiological risk to which he/she is exposed. Doses would be grouped together for assessing individual risk but the corresponding exposure situations would continue to be managed according to their specificities. The ICRP could recommend that information of this type be made available. This would facilitate the individual understanding of radiological risk, improve the transparency around the management of this risk, encourage dialogue between stakeholders and develop a culture of radiological protection. It would also help to put the radiological risk into perspective with other risks.
An approach based on these two elements would certainly help stakeholders to reach an agreement on the accepted dose level, i.e. the dose level below which it is no longer appropriate to take any action to further reduce the risk. It is agreed that it is preferable to seek this level within each given context rather than to fix in advance a generic level, and that this does not mean that vigilance should no longer be maintained.
Conclusions for the evolution of the radiological risk management system
The WG believes that there is a need for evolution of the radiological protection system in such a way that it becomes more practical and understandable to those in charge of its application and those confronted with it (judges, the public, etc). Some ideas are proposed.
The radiological protection system is based, whatever the exposure situation, on a common philosophy of risk management characterised by the current three principles of radiation protection: justification, optimisation and limitation. The WG considers that these principles have to be kept in the future system, although concrete methods for their implementation still need to be improved.
It is necessary to maintain a clear distinction between the various categories of exposure situations because of their diversity and complexity. It would nevertheless be worth redefining the current categories according to the characteristics of the relevant situations and determining specific risk management methods associated with appropriate tools and indicators.
Moreover, it would be helpful to explore the conditions for reaching the acceptability of radiological risk. Two methods are being more widely explored by professionals: improving dialogue between stakeholders and wide provision of means for an individual appraisal of risk.
Additionally, the WG agrees, like Clarke, that the issue of protection of the environment should be raised by the ICRP in the forthcoming set of general recommendations. More detailed thought will have to be given to this since there are as yet no radiological risk management criteria for the environment. Two aspects should be dealt with:
• Protection of the environment with a view to protecting humans in the long term (making particular allowance for bioaccumulation phenomena): this has already been taken into account in recommendations published by the ICRP but guidelines about how to implement it practically would undoubtedly be useful.
• Protection of the environment per se (fauna and flora). The objectives of which should be, on the one hand, to ensure the preservation of biodiversity, i.e. the protection of the many varied species and not of the individual members of them and, on the other hand, to ensure the integrity of our natural heritage which has to be preserved for symbolic, cultural and economic reasons.
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Zusammenfassung
Members of the public Exposure ×2 each 1000 to 1500 m [1] . N N Increase also with the latitude [1] . 1.1 mSv year −1 at 2000 m [2] During flight Users 1 to 12 µSv h −1 [3] .
[N] 3,4 N Paris/Dublin (95 min): 4.5 µSv [4] . Paris/Rio (675 min): 26 µSv [4] . Amsterdam/Vancouver (645 min): 70 µSv [4] . 
